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Fiction, and Femininity in Dibdin’s Hannah Hewit and
Burney’s Camilla
A N D R E A H A S L A N G E R
Tufts University
When automata appear in fiction, in the late decades of the eighteenth cen-
tury—most famously in Evelina (1778), but also in Camilla (1796) and in
Charles Dibdin’s novel, Hannah Hewit, or The Female Crusoe (1792)—they
are a female concern. The term ‘‘automaton,’’ by this point in the century,
refers not only to the models of humans and animals on display in London
and on the continent but also to mindless, repetitive behavior. Both senses
of the word attach primarily to women: female characters encounter the
automaton not only as a material object but also as a machine-like state that
besets the beautiful and the fashionable who do not or cannot think for
themselves. The strong association between the automaton and femininity,
which emerges in the 1770s and reaches its peak in the 1790s, represents a
departure from earlier Enlightenment discussions of the human’s relation
to the machine, which are carried out in universalist language and are con-
cerned with comparing the broad categories of human and machine rather
than individual types. Though both of these ideas—the idea that the au-
tomaton in fiction is primarily a figure of femininity and the idea that ear-
lier discussions of the relation between man and machine occur under the
banner of Enlightenment universalism—are critical commonplaces, no
one has addressed the relation between them. What is it that produces the
shift from the human-machine comparison to the woman-machine com-
parison? And what is fiction’s role in this transition? The answer I set out in
the following pages draws on the history of automata as well as the develop-
ment of eighteenth-century fictional forms, and focuses on two novels, Han-
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nah Hewit, or The Female Crusoe and Camilla. The reason automata get associ-
ated with femininity in these novels, I argue, is not merely because automata
increasingly come to symbolize irrationality and failed autonomy but also
because they are used as components of and commentaries on the marriage
plot. Automata become feminized, in other words, in and through the mar-
riage plot. It is telling, too, that automata are attached to the marriage plot
not only in a female coming-of-age tale like Burney’s, which we would
expect to concern marriage, but also in a Robinsonade like Dibdin’s, which
we would not. Though the connection between automata and the marriage
plot has different consequences in each novel, both use the automaton to
bring animate women into contact with inanimate machines. Embedded in
this ontological collision is a commentary on the narrative forms these
novels are adapting.
Dibdin’s novel in particular helps to answer the question I posed ear-
lier—how to explain the feminization of automata—because it reworks the
Robinsonade in a way that demonstrates that the earlier, putatively univer-
sal form of Enlightenment taxonomy, which distinguishes man from ani-
mal and machine, more or less leaves woman out. Hannah Hewit, in other
words, compares woman to animal and machine in a way that reformulates
earlier Enlightenment discourses. The connection between the automaton
and the marriage plot emerges out of these comparisons and is relevant
not only to the development of the Robinsonade across the eighteenth cen-
tury but also to the background against which we can see Burney’s polemic
unfold. Burney has been the major author considered in critical studies of
automata in fiction, but Dibdin’s work is of substantial importance—both
because Hannah Hewit builds an android automaton and because the
novel engages the philosophical claims and technological innovations that
accompanied the continuing development of automata in the late eigh-
teenth century. Hannah Hewit situates its discussion of the automaton both
within contemporary debates about the possibility of building a genuinely
intelligent android and within longer-running debates about what distin-
guishes humans from animals and machines. It demonstrates that the femi-
nization of the automaton is the product of a return, in the 1790s, to the
recurrent Enlightenment question of just how firmly it is possible to draw a
line between humans and other forms of life. The gendering of this taxon-
omy definitively presents the machine as lifeless rather than lifelike, and as
a figure of what women must be careful not to become.
The broad goal of this essay is to show that fiction is instrumental to for-
mulating the relation between automata and forms of life. The fictional
treatment of automata consolidates their significance as objects that were
likened to, as well as distinguished from, living humans, and does so in rela-
tion to the constraints facing women in particular. In the following pages,
these developments are considered alongside the philosophical arguments
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and practical innovations that paved the way for them, and the social field
that received and responded to them. The philosophical thread begins with
Rene´ Descartes and runs through mechanical materialism, notably the
work of Julien Offray de la Mettrie. The practical innovations include devel-
opments in programmable clockwork-style mechanisms that allow autom-
ata to vary their responses rather than simply repeating a set sequence of
actions over and over again. The social field centers on the growing popu-
larity of exhibits of automata across London in the 1770s, 1780s, and 1790s.
This account is distinct from the existing literature on automata—a field
established by Alfred Chapuis and Edmond Droz’s 1949 compendium, and
developed more recently by Richard Altick, Simon During, Jessica Riskin,
and Julie Park, among others—because of its emphasis on the causal role
of fiction in gendering otherwise gender-neutral categories of Enlighten-
ment discourse.1 The story that has been told about automata, in the his-
tory of science and in intellectual history, emphasizes their role as simula-
tors of human physiology, on the one hand, and as tools of sociability and
aesthetic discernment, on the other. To the extent that their presence in
fiction has been considered, it has been largely described as a figure for
mindless female behavior (in Burney), or for the shifting preoccupations
of the male sentimental protagonist (in Sterne, Mackenzie, and Smollett).2
1. See Alfred Chapuis and Edmond Droz, Automata: A Historical and Technological Study,
trans. Alec Reid (Neuchaˆtel: E´ditions du Griffon, 1958); Richard D. Altick, The Shows of London
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1978); Simon During, Modern Enchantments: The Cultural Power of
Secular Magic (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), and ‘‘‘The Temple Lives’: The
Lyceum and Romantic Show Business,’’ in Romantic Metropolis: The Urban Scene of British Culture,
1780–1840, ed. James Chandler and Kevin Gilmartin (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2005), 204–26; Julie Park, The Self and It: Novel Objects in Eighteenth-Century England (Stanford
University Press, 2010); and Jessica Riskin, ‘‘Eighteenth-Century Wetware,’’ Representations 83
(2003): 97–125, and ‘‘The Defecating Duck, or The Ambiguous Origins of Artificial Life,’’ in
Things, ed. Bill Brown (University of Chicago Press, 2004), 99–133. See also Genesis Redux:
Essays in the History and Philosophy of Artificial Life, ed. Jessica Riskin (University of Chicago Press,
2007); and Gaby Wood, Living Dolls: A Magical History of the Quest for Mechanical Life (London:
Faber & Faber, 2002).
2. Because the automata in Burney’s work have until recently been the prime examples of
automata in eighteenth-century fiction, automata have been overwhelmingly interpreted as fig-
ures for femininity. Both Claudia Johnson and Julie Park offer accounts of how the automaton,
for Burney, demonstrates the paralysis women experience in the face of maltreatment and
social difficulty. See Claudia L. Johnson, Equivocal Beings: Politics, Gender, and Sentimentality in
the 1790s; Wollstonecraft, Radcliffe, Burney, Austen (University of Chicago Press, 1995); and Park,
The Self and It. Deidre Lynch suggests that ‘‘automatized motion’’ casts light on the lives of
women in the marketplace as well as on ‘‘what is equivocal about literary character . . . because
it blurs the lines between a person and a thing, between intentional and coerced action.’’ See
Deidre Lynch, The Economy of Character: Novels, Market Culture, and the Business of Inner Meaning
(University of Chicago Press, 1998), 197. Alex Wetmore suggests a link between men of feeling
and feeling machines, arguing that virtue and the process of self-regulation were conceived as
potentially automatic or mechanical activities. Wetmore’s focus is primarily on male characters
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The connection between the gendering of the automaton and earlier forms
of taxonomy has gone unrecognized. The two genres of fiction I treat, the
Robinsonade and the female coming-of-age novel, present the boundary
between the woman and the machine as an ongoing negotiation. In each
genre, the automaton puts pressure on what is understood to distinguish
women from other life forms.
F R O M M E R E M A C H I N E T O M A N - M A C H I N E :
T H E A U T O M A T O N I N D E S C A R T E S
A N D L A M E T T R I E
Before turning to automata in fiction, I want to briefly lay out a few aspects
of their history that are especially relevant to their appearance in fiction.
Automata, or self-moving machines, experienced great popularity through-
out the eighteenth century. Most were human figures, roughly the size of
large children: though their inner workings were composed of gears and
pinions, they were housed in lifelike bodies, painted to resemble humans,
and in a few cases covered with real skin. Typically, they performed a set
routine, like playing a song on the flute. They were displayed in public
spaces, pleasure gardens, and museums in London and across Europe, and
became especially ubiquitous after 1770.3 Cox’s Museum, a display of au-
tomata that was open to the public from 1772 to 1775, is one of the best-
known exhibits: it attracted large crowds, was visited by Samuel Johnson
and Frances Burney, among others, and features in a well-known scene
from Evelina.4 But it is not merely the public’s fascination with automata
that accounts for their growing popularity at the end of the eighteenth cen-
tury. Something else happens during this period as well: automaton tech-
nology becomes more sophisticated and more programmable, and this
facilitates a change in what automata are designed to simulate. They move
from replicating the work of the body to replicating the work of the mind.
Whereas earlier models were built to model physiological processes, like
breathing, blinking, and digestion, later models began to approximate
who get described as mechanical, and he explores how the mechanics of feeling illustrate a
larger ambivalence about how sensibility affects masculinity. See Alex Wetmore, ‘‘Sympathy
Machines: Men of Feeling and the Automaton,’’ Eighteenth-Century Studies 43 (2009): 37–54.
3. The major displays of automata in London from 1770 to 1800 include Cox’s Museum, in
the Great Room, Spring Gardens (1772–75); Henri Louis Jacquet Droz’s writer, draftsman,
and harpsichord player in Covent Garden (1776); Kempelen’s chess-playing Turk (1783–84);
the speaking infant, exhibited in the Glass Warehouse near Haymarket (1785); and Maillar-
det’s replicas of Jacquet Droz’s figures, including a writer and a question-answering magician.
See Altick, Shows of London, 62–71, 350.
4. For a reading of this scene that offers a detailed account of Cox’s Museum and the Great
Room, see During, Modern Enchantments, 215–58.
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intelligence and reason.5 These figures write, draw, and speak; they answer
questions and even play chess. Unlike earlier automata, which performed
the same set of actions over and over again, these figures were advertised as
responsive: they were theoretically able to respond to a changing environ-
ment.
These apparently intelligent automata were seen as extensions of the
mechanical materialist idea that all living bodies operated like machines: if
this was true, inventors surmised, it might be possible to build machines
that would operate like living bodies. Though figures like these were first
produced in the 1770s and 1780s, they had been imagined by earlier think-
ers, like Descartes, who used them to think through the distinctions be-
tween humans, animals, and machines. In the Discourse on Method (1637),
Descartes describes a thought experiment that uses automata to distinguish
between humans (who have machine-like bodies but also possess conscious-
ness) and animals (which also have machine-like bodies but lack conscious-
ness).6 Descartes asks his reader to imagine that extremely sophisticated
automata can be built, and to imagine comparing a living monkey with an
automaton monkey, and then a living human with an android automaton.
He goes on to claim that it would be impossible to distinguish between the
living monkey and the automaton model because monkeys in particular
and nonhuman animals in general do not have the capacity to reason: ‘‘If
there were such machines having the organs and outward shape of a mon-
key or any other irrational animal,’’ he writes, ‘‘we would have no means of
knowing that they were not of exactly the same nature as these animals.’’7
In contrast, it would be easy to distinguish between a living human and an
5. Riskin is, to the best of my knowledge, the first to make the point that the vast majority of
eighteenth-century European automata simulate organic processes. Her work on automata is
indispensable. See Riskin, ‘‘Eighteenth-Century Wetware’’ and ‘‘Defecating Duck.’’ Some of
the examples Riskin cites are anatomies used as teaching models. A more extensive discussion
of the historical and literary import of one particular type of anatomy, called the mechanical
mother, which modeled the womb and was used to instruct midwives, can be found in Bonnie
Blackwell, ‘‘Tristram Shandy and the Theater of the Mechanical Mother,’’ ELH 68 (2001): 81–
133.
6. Descartes addresses the human body in particular in the posthumously published Treatise
on Man. This text takes the form of an extended metaphor that likens the body to a mechanical
fountain, run by a rational fountaineer. Though Descartes’s dualism is obviously in conflict
with materialism’s monism, and though his theological commitments are in conflict with the
declared atheism of La Mettrie’s later version of materialism, Descartes’s account of the opera-
tion of bodies in Discourse on Method and Treatise on Man offers clear evidence of his materialist
understanding of physiology. For a discussion of Descartes’s idea of the machine body, see
Lenora Cohen Rosenfield, From Beast-Machine to Man-Machine: Animal Soul in French Letters from
Descartes to La Mettrie (New York: Octagon Books, 1968).
7. Rene´ Descartes, A Discourse on Method, trans. Ian Maclean (Oxford University Press,
2006), 46.
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android, because even if this automaton could speak, it could not vary its
responses as a living human could, and its lack of consciousness would
become evident:
For we can well conceive of a machine made in such a way that it emits
words, and even utters them about bodily actions which bring about some
corresponding change in its organs (if, for example, we touch it on a given
spot, it will ask what we want of it; or if we touch it somewhere else, it will
cry out that we are hurting it, and so on); but it is not conceivable that it
should put these words in different orders to correspond to the meaning
of things said in its presence, as even the most dull-witted of men can do.
And the second means is that, although such machines might do many
things as well or even better than any of us, they would inevitably fail to do
some others, by which we would discover that they did not act consciously,
but only because their organs were disposed in a certain way.8
For Descartes, rationality and conscious action are the province of the
human. Both the animal, whose body operates like a machine, and the
automaton, whose body is a machine, are fundamentally nonrational: each
might cry out in pain, but this is not enough to make them thinking beings.
The emphasis on rationality, and in turn on communicative reason and lan-
guage, creates a chasm between the human and the nonhuman and flat-
tens the distinction between the animal and the automaton.
In the following century, the assertion of the equivalence between living
bodies and machines persisted, not only in materialism but also in the dis-
cussion of automata design. Whereas for Descartes the mere machine can-
not be rational, for La Mettrie it can, because ‘‘the excellence of reason does
not depend on its immateriality.’’9 La Mettrie’s idea that all living beings are
organic machines driven by instinct allows for aligning a machine with
thought and with moral behavior, so that ‘‘to be a machine, to feel, think,
know good from evil like blue from yellow, in a word, to be born with intelli-
gence and a sure instinct for morality, and yet to be only an animal [is no
contradiction].’’10 Here the machine is the central concept that makes life
intelligible rather than a category distinct from or opposed to it, and feeling
and thought are essential qualities of the machine. La Mettrie writes opti-
mistically about increasingly sophisticated automata design, noting that in
view of Vaucanson’s success with his duck and flute player, ‘‘a talking man
[is] a mechanism no longer to be regarded as impossible.’’11 However, this
does not therefore mean that his concept of the living machine necessarily
8. Ibid., 46–47.
9. Julien Offray de La Mettrie, Man a Machine and Man a Plant, trans. Richard A. Watson
and Maya Rybalka (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994), 28.
10. Ibid., 71.
11. Ibid., 69.
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encompasses the automaton. La Mettrie conceives of the machine as
organic, made from flesh and blood rather than gears and pinions, and he
distinguishes between the machine of the living body, which is constantly
learning and developing, and the machine of the android model, which is
not.12 This distinction, which is clear in La Mettrie’s work, more or less dis-
appears in the popular imagination, which uses the materialist concept of
the machine to license the extension of feeling and thought to android
automata. In the roughly twenty years between the publication of L’homme
machine (1748) and the exhibition of ‘‘a talking man’’ and other intelligent
androids, the idea that a thinking, feeling machine could be built, not born,
gathers momentum. But if the conceptual promise of intelligent androids
seemed to encourage the inclusion of automata in La Mettrie’s category of
the machine, the reality of these objects reasserted the fundamental differ-
ence between the living and the nonliving.
Whereas both Descartes and La Mettrie were only imagining the possibil-
ities of the speaking automata they described, Dibdin and Burney were writ-
ing at a moment when exhibits of automata included apparently intelligent
figures like Kempelen’s chess player, a question-answering infant, and an
oracular highlander. Skepticism about these figures was thick in the air,
too: Samuel Johnson wrote in a letter that the question-answering infant
must have been a fake, for ‘‘no mechanism can provide answers to arbitrary
questions,’’ and suspicions ran high about the mechanism driving the chess
player, which was later revealed to be a small boy concealed in the cabinet
upon which the chess player sat.13 What happens in fiction responds to
these currents of opinion. Dibdin’s use of the automaton restages both the
optimism with which these figures were anticipated and the unevenness
with which they were received. Burney, in contrast, begins from the assump-
tion that the machine is fundamentally mindless, no matter how human it
may appear, and imports the machine’s definitive failure to approximate
reason into her discussion of femininity. While in Dibdin the machine is
radically opposed to the human, in Burney it is constitutive of it, and in
both novels it is a limit-case of femininity.14 The trajectory I track, in consid-
ering the use of automata in Dibdin and Burney, respectively, presents a
compressed reception history of android automata in the late eighteenth
century and considers the conceptual consequences of these machines’ fail-
12. See, e.g., ibid., 38–39, 69–70.
13. Quoted in Altick, Shows of London, 68.
14. Burney’s use of the automaton troubles the apparent genderlessness of the man-
machine question. Before the automaton became associated with femininity, it was associated
with the man-machine, which for La Mettrie was effectively the human-machine, but for writers
of fiction like John Cleland and Laurence Sterne, was specifically masculine and concerned
with economies of sex and sentiment.
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ures to approximate reason or responsiveness. The stylistic and generic dif-
ferences between Dibdin and Burney provide further explanation for their
different uses of the automaton, as I will discuss, but what is common to
both is that the introduction of the automaton into fiction brings the ideo-
logical content of certain formal conventions to light. The android autom-
aton—the human machine—becomes a symbol of the pressures social
norms exert on female protagonists.
W O M A N , A N I M A L , A U T O M A T O N : C O M P A N I O N S H I P
A N D F E M I N I N I T Y I N H A N N A H H E W I T
Hannah Hewit, or The Female Crusoe is the third female Robinsonade written
in English. Its two predecessors, The Life of Charlotta du Pont (1723) and The
Female American (1767) hardly share enough in common to amount to a dis-
cernible genre, and both significantly depart from Defoe’s original.15 Dib-
din’s novel, in contrast, reproduces the basic plot structure of Robinson Cru-
soe.16 Whereas Crusoe goes to sea in defiance of his father’s wishes, Hannah
Hewit sets out in search of her husband, who is overdue in returning from
India. When she fails to find him there, she begins her return voyage, run-
ning aground off one of the Comoros Islands in the Indian Ocean, where
she is marooned.17 It is here that her Crusoe story unfolds, as Hannah
builds her dwelling, produces her own food, and interacts with the animals
of the island. She fills her mornings with manual labor and her afternoons
writing her life history. The activities with which she occupies herself, like
building furniture and making a comb ‘‘formed out of the shell of a land
crab,’’ first supply her necessities and later ‘‘luxuries, as it would give a new
spur to my genius, and employ my mind, ever active in those pursuits best
calculated to expand it’’ (2:201–2). As the female Crusoe goes about her
labors, the following question arises: can you place a female Crusoe on an
island, expose her to various adversities, and produce the same kind of nar-
rative as for Robinson?
15. There is also Zelia in the Desert (1789), translated from the French original. Hannah
Hewit, or The Female Crusoe is the second novel to be advertised with the female Crusoe moniker
(the other was Zelia in the Desert), and the first to include the phrase as a subtitle.
16. Though the plot of Hannah Hewit is somewhat less coherent than that of Robinson Cru-
soe, and though Hannah claims that she has not ‘‘read Robinson Crusoe, Alexander Selkirk,
Peter Quarles, nor any of those books, which would of course have afforded me, in my situa-
tion, many serviceable hints,’’ Dibdin explicitly modeled his tale on Defoe’s novel. Charles Dib-
din, Hannah Hewit, or The Female Crusoe, supposed to be written by herself (London: Printed for
C. Dibdin, n.d. [1792]), 2:192, hereafter cited parenthetically in the text.
17. For a discussion of the relation between Dibdin’s novel and the wreck of the Grosvenor,
see Ian E. Glenn, ‘‘The Wreck of the Grosvenor and the Making of South African Literature,’’
English in Africa 22 (1995): 1–18.
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The answer is, unsurprisingly, no. The degree to which the introduction
of a female protagonist changes the Robinsonade is instructive in clarifying
just how much the Robinsonade is a tale of masculine adventure. The Cru-
soe figure, when shipwrecked, is cast back in time and into a state of nature:
as he mixes his labor with the land, developing agriculture and later enclo-
sure, he follows the trajectory of social contract. Ultimately, he comes to
govern the other human and animal inhabitants on the island, which marks
their collective entrance into civil society.18 Defoe’s novel, like theories of
social contract as well as later Robinsonades, imagines natural man as, quite
literally, a man; the appearance of a female Crusoe breaks with one of the
major conventions of the genre. This is in part because women are more or
less invisible in the traditional Robinsonade; natural woman, as opposed to
natural man, is not an operative conceptual category for the Robinsonade
or for the political philosophy it engages. Women are necessary to the con-
tinuance of natural as well as civil society, but they are relegated to the
periphery of its theorization as well as of its fictional representation in the
Robinsonade. Take, for example, the single time Robinson Crusoe men-
tions his wife. In the space of two sentences, he notes that he married, ‘‘not
either to my Disadvantage or Dissatisfaction,’’ and had children, but that
his wife died and he went back to sea as a ‘‘private Trader to the East
Indies.’’19 The heterosexual marriage plot is peripheral to the Robinsonade
because it happens off the island and disrupts the island’s single-sex com-
munity of masculine individualism.
But even though there are no women on Crusoe’s island, Crusoe enjoys
a developed domestic and family life. He spends a great deal of time main-
taining and improving his household, and in the twenty-four years he lives
on the island before Friday arrives, he grows attached to his animals, taking
pleasure in the company of his dog, teaching his parrot, Poll, to speak ‘‘so
articulately and plain, that it was very pleasant to me,’’ and taming a goat
kid ‘‘[until] the creature became so loving, so gentle, and so fond, that it
became from that Time one of my Domesticks also, and would never leave
me afterwards’’ (152, 96). Crusoe develops his domestic economy first for
survival and then for pleasure. The novel’s politics do not separate the
18. Critics have read Defoe’s novel as allied with Lockean as well as Hobbesian accounts of
the social contract. See Manuel Schonhorn, Defoe’s Politics: Parliament, Power, Kingship and ‘‘Rob-
inson Crusoe’’ (Cambridge University Press, 1991); Nancy Armstrong, ‘‘Bourgeois Morality and
the Paradox of Individualism,’’ in The Novel, vol. 2, ed. Franco Moretti (Princeton University
Press, 2006), 349–88; Peter Hulme, Colonial Encounters: Europe and the Native Caribbean, 1492–
1797 (London: Methuen, 1986), esp. 186–87, 217. Hulme is dismissive of readings of Crusoe as
a tale of the move from natural to political society but does note the novel’s Hobbesian interest
in the sovereign’s power of life and death over his subjects.
19. Daniel Defoe, Robinson Crusoe, ed. Thomas Keymer (New York: Oxford University Press,
2007), 256–57, hereafter cited parenthetically in the text.
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realms of home and government but, instead, understand government to
develop first in the household and later outside of it. As a result, the bonds
of familial affection and those of sovereignty are deeply entangled, first with
Crusoe’s animal subjects and later with Friday. The goat is a loving ‘‘Domes-
tick,’’ and so is Friday, later in the novel. Though none of these subjects is
female, femininity enters the novel by way of the homology between Cru-
soe’s authority over his subjects, including his family, and the marriage rela-
tion.20 Crusoe is the paterfamilias without a wife; his paternity is political,
and it grants him domestic as well as public authority. Hannah Hewit, in
contrast, is no sovereign; she is a wife missing a husband, and her interac-
tions with the animals around her show her to be in search of, rather than
in possession of, authority. This brings us back to the relation between the
adventure plot and marriage: while heterosexual marriage between white
Britons of similar station is more or less absent from the plot of Robinson
Crusoe—we get those two lines, but that is all—companionship and domes-
ticity shape the novel. This matters because the domestic is presented as the
origin of the political and because Friday’s relation to Crusoe resembles a
marriage in certain ways, which demonstrates the centrality of marriage to
the formation of political society while also romanticizing the relationship
between sovereign and colonial subject.
When the novel fluctuates between describing Friday’s relation to Crusoe
as elective, on the one hand, and as a matter of life and death, on the other,
it picks up not simply on the relationship between sovereignty and colonial-
ism but also on the shadowy presence of marriage in this discourse.21 Friday
is variously referred to as Crusoe’s slave (the word appears only once), ser-
vant, and companion. As Roxann Wheeler has shown, the novel’s relatively
interchangeable use of these terms produces a crossover between these cate-
gories that reflects the multiple determinants of colonial relations (includ-
ing religion, cultural practices, and race) at work in Defoe’s text.22 Wheeler
argues that it is essential to take into account not simply Friday’s status as a
20. Race and religion are crucial factors that differentiate Friday as well, as I discuss. I do
not mean to suggest that marriage is the or even a dominant mode of differentiating sovereign
from subject in Robinson Crusoe, only that the marriage relation is invoked because sovereignty
is represented in terms of protection and obligation, which bears obvious similarities to tradi-
tional expectations about the husband-wife pairing.
21. Daniel Carey notes this as well in ‘‘Reading Contrapuntally: Robinson Crusoe, Slavery,
and Postcolonial Theory,’’ in The Postcolonial Enlightenment, ed. Daniel Carey and Lynn Festa
(Oxford University Press, 2009), 105–36, 121–22. Peter Hulme points to how Robinson Crusoe
uses the romance form to simplify the colonial relation, going on to say that ‘‘the true romance
in Robinson Crusoe is between Crusoe and Friday. They live in domestic bliss. . . . Though this
[the delight Crusoe takes in Friday] is not easy to separate from a master’s joy in a well-propor-
tioned and healthy slave’’ (Colonial Encounters, 212).
22. See Roxann Wheeler, The Complexion of Race: Categories of Difference in Eighteenth-Century
British Culture (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000), 86.
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Carib but also as a non-Christian and as a former cannibal in considering
how Crusoe understands and justifies Friday’s servitude. Crusoe’s concern
for Friday’s salvation, in conjunction with his deep affection for him, is cru-
cial here because it diffuses their master/servant relationship into a benevo-
lent, paternalistic, consensual relation in which Crusoe is the ‘‘benefactor’’
rather than ‘‘exploiter.’’23 This can make Friday’s attachment to Crusoe look
like a bond of his own making. When Crusoe begins to discuss leaving the
island, for example, Friday says that he would rather be killed than be sepa-
rated from his master: ‘‘You take, kill Friday; (says he.) What must I kill you for?
said I again, He returns very quick, What you send Friday away for? Take, kill
Friday, no send Friday away. This he spoke so earnestly, that I saw Tears stand
in his Eyes: In a Word, I so plainly discover’d the utmost Affection in him to
me, and a firm Resolution in him, that I told him then, and often after, that
I would never send him away from me, if he was willing to stay with me’’
(191). Crusoe reads Friday’s response as affection, but it is equally possible
to read it as a literalization of Friday’s awareness that his physical existence
has come to depend on Crusoe. Though Hannah Hewit never puts it so
starkly, in both novels a similar structure can be seen in operation, whereby
one character cannot survive without his or her protector, to whom he or
she is bound by enforced but affectionate consent. However much we might
hope to find untroubled mutuality between these Crusoes and their compa-
nions, it is structurally unavailable to them. Read in tandem, Robinson Crusoe
and Hannah Hewit show that neither servitude nor marriage develops out-
side of a structure of obligation based on protection, a structure, in other
words, where someone protects and someone else is protected.
Even so, we might imagine that the female Robinsonade offers potential
to rewrite the traditional Robinsonade and specifically to challenge the link
it forges between masculinity and the governance of oneself and others.
After all, the female Robinsonade removes its female protagonist from pre-
sent or impending conjugal domesticity and maroons her on an island to
meditate on the social forms available to independent women. This would
appear to present an opportunity for utopian feminism and for the imagi-
nation of new social forms. In the German tradition, this is often the case,
as Jeannine Blackwell has documented, but in Dibdin’s novel, it is not, or
not so in any straightforward way.24 Though Hannah Hewit is highly skilled
as an inventor, architect, and builder, as any Crusoe must be, she neither
settles comfortably into a single-sex domestic arrangement nor rises to
great heights of individualism. In Hannah Hewit, the female Robinsonade
provides more of an occasion for satire than for egalitarianism; and though
23. Ibid., 81.
24. See Jeannine Blackwell, ‘‘An Island of Her Own: Heroines of the German Robinson-
ades from 1720 to 1800,’’ German Quarterly 58 (1985): 5–26.
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Hannah Hewit is highly capable, her ambivalence, at best, and abjection, at
worst, about her separation from her husband is so pervasive that it subordi-
nates the adventure plot to the marriage plot. Rather, it draws the marriage
plot out of the adventure plot. Stuck on an island, the female Crusoe is not
acting out a political fiction of social contract but mulling over one of its
corollaries: the demands and desires that follow from, and are concen-
trated in, the conjugal imperative.
Marriage is never far from the novel’s focus and is a prime mover of the
plot as well as a magnet for much of the desire articulated by Hannah while
she is marooned. Unlike the traditional Robinsonade, whose relation to the
marriage plot is only implicit, the female Robinsonade is constituted in
clear relation to it. Marriage is behind many of the major episodes of Dib-
din’s novel, including Hannah’s shipwreck. Her yearning for male company
is a frequent refrain, and in the absence of human companions, she devel-
ops emotional attachments and aversions to animals. This reprises a stock
feature of the traditional Robinsonade but changes its significance: whereas
in Robinson Crusoe human-animal relationships are described in terms of
sovereignty, in Hannah Hewit they are glossed as affective exchanges with
conjugal or maternal overtones. Crusoe relates sitting down to dinner with
his ‘‘little family’’ of animals and remarks, ‘‘I had the lives of all my subjects
at my absolute command. I could hang, draw, give liberty, and take it
away . . . to see how like a king I dined, too, all alone attended by my ser-
vants!’’ (125–26).25 Here sovereignty is bound up directly with the sover-
eign’s exclusive right to the justified use of violence. This recalls the remark
Carl Schmitt makes about Hobbes, that ‘‘the protego ergo obligo [I protect,
therefore I obligate] is the cogito ergo sum of the state.’’26 If protego ergo obligo is
Crusoe’s motto, it is hardly Hannah Hewit’s. Hannah does not consider the
creatures around her subjects, and insofar as she forms relationships with
them, they are represented as benevolent and loving (as in the case of her
companion lion, Leo) or violent and suggestive of unwanted sexual ad-
vances (as in the case of the baboon that embraces her). These two animals,
the lion and the baboon, represent opposing forms of masculinity: the for-
mer will protect Hannah from the latter and from its aura of racialized fears
about predatory sexuality. Hannah seeks the protection of these creatures,
rather than protecting them; she resides within the logic of protegor ergo obli-
gor [I am protected, therefore I am obligated]. She, like Crusoe’s family of
25. Once Crusoe has acquired human subjects as well, he reflects further: ‘‘it was a merry
Reflection which I frequently made, How like a King I look’d. . . . My people were perfectly sub-
jected: I was absolute Lord and Law-giver; they all owed their Lives to me, and were ready to lay
down their lives, if there had been Occasion of it, for me’’ (Defoe, Robinson Crusoe, 203).
26. Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, trans. George Schwab (University of Chicago
Press, 1996), 52.
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animals and later, like his human subjects, is not sovereign but subject. To
the extent that a political fiction of protection and obligation underwrites
the female Robinsonade, then, its paradigmatic form is not the relation
between sovereign and subject but that between husband and wife.
Hannah Hewit is a testament to the fact that the marriage plot can suffuse
even the genres that, on the surface, appear to resist it. Hannah Hewit’s
mental life is shaped throughout by the constraints the marriage plot places
on what can be thought or desired. Even though Dibdin is writing against
the backdrop of the debates about women’s roles and rights in the 1790s,
and even though the female Robinsonade has potential as a feminist form,
Hannah Hewit toes a conservative line about women. The novel is formally
playful and uneven in all kinds of ways, but it is consistent in its message that
female autonomy is a contradiction in terms. Autonomy, as it operates in
the Robinsonade, is masculine, though not available to all men, and is cate-
gorically unavailable to women—both Friday and Hannah Hewit lack it.
The gendering of autonomy—which is more or less invisible in contract
theory—becomes apparent when even the most technically competent
female Crusoe, as Hannah Hewit is, cannot fully function outside of mar-
riage and reproductive domesticity. Like Friday, Hannah does not fulfill
the conditions of the sovereign, and her interactions with her companions,
like Friday’s, are presented as proof of her nonautonomy.
So it is clear that the female Crusoe is not interchangeable with the male
Crusoe. But at this point a more particular question comes into focus: what
do Hannah Hewit’s adventures tell us about the use of human-animal or
human-machine encounters to describe the experience of femininity and
marriage in the 1790s? What is it that makes woman a category to be taxono-
mized alongside animals and machines? It is a truism that the late Enlight-
enment is concerned with what marks man out from other categories of
being, like animals and machines, but this discourse is often understood as
gender neutral. In Dibdin’s and Burney’s novels, it is anything but: the
question is not about man, animal, and machine, but woman, animal, and
machine.27 Each can be read as displaying the broken fragments of Enlight-
enment universalism, and each is shot through with an awareness of how
27. In Foe, J. M. Coetzee’s rewriting of Robinson Crusoe, Coetzee suggests that there was a
woman, Susan Barton, on the island all along, and that she brings the adventure tale to Mr.
Foe, the author of Robinson Crusoe, only to be written out of it. Coetzee’s point is not only that
the marriage plot is part of the Robinsonade from the beginning but also more specifically that
this has taxonomic implications for women. In a scene oddly reminiscent of Hannah Hewit,
Susan Barton remarks, ‘‘Before setting out to perform his island duties, Cruso gave me his knife
and warned me not to venture from his castle; for the apes, he said, would not be as wary of a
woman as they were of him and Friday. I wondered at this: was a woman, to an ape, a different
species from a man? Nevertheless, I prudently obeyed, and stayed at home, and rested’’ ( J. M.
Coetzee, Foe [London: Penguin, 1986], 15).
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different woman is from man, in the rights afforded her and in the founda-
tional tales told about her.
In view of this, Hannah Hewit’s encounters with her companions, both
animal and machine, are significant not only in relation to the Robinson-
ade as a genre but also to the broader question of how the 1790s used ani-
mals and especially machines as figures to reflect female thought and
behavior. This is not to suggest that these fictions turn women into animals
or machines, though Burney gets close, but rather that these categories per-
form gendered work in these texts. As I have noted above, much of Dibdin’s
novel follows the format of Robinson Crusoe relatively closely, and at first it
seems as if Hannah Hewit is simply constructing a slightly more luxurious
life for herself than Crusoe does. Again, like Crusoe, she interacts with the
animals on her island, finding them at turns threatening and welcoming,
but nevertheless seeking their company. But the way she interacts with
these animals definitively sets her apart from her male predecessors: her
encounters with animals are framed by the question of whether the ani-
mals are sufficient substitutes for the companionship of her husband. The
woman-animal interaction is never merely one of friendship or labor, but
one that evaluates animals’ potential as surrogates. Animals on the island
seem to occupy one of two extremes: either they are hostile, and their hos-
tility is glossed as an unwanted sexual advance, or they are friendly, and
their friendship is presented as an important source of companionship. So,
for instance, when Hannah is nearly attacked by the monkeys and baboons
on her island, her description of this encodes an obvious but sublimated
fear of the sexual aggression of subaltern men. And when she takes an
orphaned young lion into her care, her relationship with this lion, Leo, is
from the beginning presented in companionate terms. Here, the animal
embodies both protective and predatory instincts and is used to naturalize
a division between European and non-European men, the former being
domesticated and the latter, wild.
This is made explicit by the way Hannah frames her first encounter with
him: seeing Leo, she says, makes her think of the episode of Una and the
lion from The Faerie Queene. Una encounters the lion when she is traveling
alone and tames him with her beauty, so that he becomes her protector
and guards her chastity as she travels in search of her suitor, the Red Cross
Knight.28 The substitutive logic here—when a young lady is without her
28. The lion initially charges Una but stops once he has recognized her beauty: he, ‘‘with
the sight amazd, forgat his furious forse.’’ As for the lion’s protection of Una’s chastity, ‘‘The
Lyon would not leaue her desolate, / But with her went along, as a strong gard / Of her chast
person, and a faithfull mate / Of her sad troubles and misfortunes hard.’’ See Edmund Spen-
ser, The Faerie Queene, ed. Thomas P. Roche Jr. (New York: Penguin Books, 1978), 1.3.5.9,
1.3.4.1–4.
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suitor, she requires protection from a male who will not usurp her lover’s
place—is transferred directly into Dibdin’s novel. The intelligence of ani-
mals is presented within the context of women’s need for protection;
female kindness to animals secures their loyalty and defense. It is notable
that Hannah (and Una) win over their animal protectors with their beauty
and feeling, and that their relationships with these creatures are described
primarily in terms of emotional bonds that offer a placeholder for mar-
riage. This is a far cry from the sovereignty Robinson Crusoe claims over his
creatures, saying, ‘‘I could hang, draw, give liberty, and take it away’’ (125).
Both male and female Crusoes enter into domestic relations with ani-
mals and have command over them, but where the male Crusoe uses ani-
mals to experience being sovereign, the female Crusoe employs them as
protectors and proxy husbands. In place of the contract theory that under-
lies Defoe’s vision of the man-animal relation, Dibdin’s novel invokes a chi-
valric tale to describe the woman-animal relation. The political fiction of
male individualism is replaced by the female need for companionship,
which is depicted both as a trope of romance and as a fact of contemporary
life. Though Leo becomes a companion as well as a fellow laborer, carrying
‘‘three thousand bricks a day’’ in a pannier, he neither becomes Hannah’s
subject nor wholly replaces her husband (3:63). Nevertheless, Hannah goes
so far as to consider the possibility that he is a reincarnation of her husband:
‘‘If I could prevail upon myself to believe in the doctrine of Pythagoras,’’
she remarks, ‘‘I might be tempted to think that the soul of [ John] Hewit,
when it fled his existence, returned to inhabit this noble beast, that so he
might yet be my protector’’ (3:116). Hannah’s invocation of metempsycho-
sis, which she cannot quite bring herself to believe, presents the female-ani-
mal relation as one of projected need. The inevitable shortcomings of the
surrogate—of course a lion cannot be like a husband—point up female
longing as an internalization of the broader formal difficulty of keeping a
marriageable or married female character single. The slippage we see when
Hannah is treating her companion lion as part animal and part man is not
a reflection of a growing belief in animal sensitivity and intelligence so
much as it is an indication that even the most capable woman knows that
she cannot be left alone and so will do what it takes to secure a companion
for herself, even if it is not a human but an animal or a machine.
Ultimately, Leo’s inability to speak with Hannah wears on her, and she
begins to worry that without an interlocutor, she will lose her reason. What
happens next is the most peculiar episode in the novel, and surely also one
of the oddest scenes in Anglophone literature of the 1790s: it harnesses
Hannah’s technical brilliance in service of her need to replace her hus-
band. Hannah decides that, lacking a human companion, she will engineer
an android automaton. Instead of finding Friday, as Robinson Crusoe does,
she builds him. But instead of building a same-sex companion, as the
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Robinsonade would typically dictate, she builds a male automaton that
looks and sounds like her husband. Hannah’s decision to build a model of
her husband represents a radical revision to the stock Robinsonade plot—
not only in introducing a machine into the mix but also in presenting the
machine in the context of female need for male companionship. The male
android is, among other things, physical evidence of how the marriage plot
intrudes upon the adventure tale and how it has subtended it in previous,
more masculine, incarnations. But perhaps what is oddest about this turn
of events is the novel’s deadpan tone. Hannah’s narration focuses on the
technical details of building the automaton and is utterly unself-conscious
about the motivations behind her choice of companion. Even so, this por-
tion of Dibdin’s novel is notable for at least two reasons: first, it offers an
impressively accurate account of contemporary automaton technology and,
second, it presents a gendered account of the human-machine relation. In
other words, the novel does not merely mirror this stage of technological
development as part of a narrative of progress but also explores the regions
of fantasy made available by these speaking automatons.
In contrast to the twenty-first-century paradigm of female androids with
feminized appearances and voices, guiding GPS systems or directing users
through a set of questions, the automata built and displayed in the late
eighteenth century were by no means exclusively female. The android fig-
ures that captivated the public were male as well as female, and the figures
that spoke or wrote—the figures, in other words, that were designed to
exhibit intelligence, like the chess player, the draftsman, and the question-
answering magician—were almost exclusively male. We know that many,
but by no means all, of the audience members who went to see automata
were female, and so in this regard Hannah Hewit follows convention in con-
structing a male android and supplying it with a female audience. Han-
nah’s choice to reconstruct her husband is unorthodox, to say the least, but
her description of what she hopes her figure will be able to do follows con-
temporary discussions of automaton design remarkably closely. Specifically,
it captures the belief that late eighteenth-century automata presented a
promise of greater animation and more personality than earlier models.
Their ability to speak words or sentences made it seem possible that autom-
ata, in speaking, could manifest intelligence and could be built to be inter-
active companions. This is certainly the hope that motivates Hannah: ‘‘A
common penny toy cries cuckoo as plain as the cuckoo itself,’’ she observes,
‘‘[so] an automaton, or rather an autologon, might soon be taught to speak
Italian’’ (3:92). English will present more of a challenge, but Hannah is
committed to the idea that her ‘‘automaton should speak English; nasals,
gutturals, and all’’ (3:92). She continues, ‘‘How I was charmed at the cir-
cumstance! It would be a sort of companion to me! It continually ran in my
head, and I was determined to lose no time in bringing it to perfection’’
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(3:92–93). Hannah’s use of the term ‘‘autologon,’’ which is the first I have
been able to find, draws a deliberate distinction between machines that are
merely self-moving (automata) and those that can independently reason
and speak (autologons). Dibdin is probably mocking the optimism of con-
temporary engineers with this neologism, but even so, Hannah’s belief in
the possibility of building a machine that could think and speak takes aim
at the thoroughgoing skepticism, from Descartes onward, that a machine
could display sensitivity akin to a human’s.
As is so often the case, the execution of the concept does not entirely live
up to Hannah’s expectations. The machine’s speech accounts for its mag-
netism as well as its limitations. This brings the fantasy of building a substi-
tute husband up against the reality of how such a machine actually speaks
and also directs attention to the problem of where this speech is coming
from and just whose speech it is. Once Hannah has built the figure she
installs a ‘‘pair of bellows’’ in it to simulate its lungs, as well as series of pipes
built to serve the purpose of the vocal chords, throat, and mouth, using the
mechanisms of wind instruments to mimic the human voice.29 When this
mechanism is completed, she programs it. She first teaches—this is her
word—the figure a set of interjections. Here, Crusoe’s initial lesson to Fri-
day, in which he teaches him three words—‘‘master,’’ ‘‘yes,’’ and ‘‘no’’—gets
reprised as ‘‘Oh, ah, humph, [spoken] as correctly as a critic who was asked
if he recollected a particular beauty in Shakespeare’’ (3:94). Hannah’s
instruction of the automaton, like Crusoe’s of Friday, encourages repetition
of a set vocabulary. When Friday goes on to utter a series of short exclama-
tions, like ‘‘O Master! O Master! O Sorrow! O bad!,’’ he repeats and recom-
bines what he has learned, and the repetition of the word ‘‘Master,’’ which
Friday uses in place of Crusoe’s name, is a reminder of how the pair’s rela-
tion is founded on Friday’s obedience (194). Though both Friday and the
automaton are taught to use language as a marker of their relationships to
Crusoe and Hewit, respectively, and though their initial speech seems more
29. Hannah’s account of how she builds her automaton is technically relatively precise and
resembles the description of speaking machines that engineers like Erasmus Darwin and Wolf-
gang von Kempelen wrote. In 1771, Erasmus Darwin constructed a speaking mouth, using a silk
ribbon for the larynx, and it said ‘‘‘mama, papa, map, and pam’ in a ‘most plaintive tone’’’
(quoted in Riskin, ‘‘Eighteenth-Century Wetware,’’ 105–6). Kempelen, the builder of the fa-
mous automaton chess player, undertook a speaking machine as well which replicated speech
by using a mechanism in the form of a box on a table covered with a cloth (Chapuis and Droz,
Automata, 322). He developed more sophisticated sound patterns than Darwin and was able to
get his speaking machine to utter a wider collection of words, including ‘‘opera, astronomy, Con-
stantinopolis, secundus, Romanorum Imperator semper augustus’’ by designing a mouth ‘‘made up of
a funnel or a bell-shaped device made of stretchable rubber, which by virtue of its physical prop-
erties was almost as flexible as human speech organs’’ (Chapuis and Droz, Automata, 322). How-
ever, neither Darwin nor Kempelen was able to exhibit a speaking figure with the mechanism
contained in the figure’s body; Darwin exhibited a head and Kempelen a bellowed box.
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like ventriloquy than genuine utterance, the effect is not precisely a com-
parison of Friday to a machine, because Friday continues to learn and is ulti-
mately far more responsive than Hannah’s automaton. Both are used for
domestic purposes and speak without necessarily knowing the meaning of
what they are saying, but Friday gains linguistic competence as he continues
to speak. Though Friday’s English is never fluent—Crusoe is always inter-
preting and rephrasing his remarks—he is not merely a machine. Yet his
language never stops marking him out; his broken syntax and erratic speech
distinguish him from Crusoe, his master.
This episode in Dibdin’s novel brings the domestic desire of the Robin-
sonade plot to the surface in the form of the speaking android. When Han-
nah engineers the figure to transpose and retranspose words to ‘‘form dif-
ferent sentences,’’ she reports that, ‘‘by this method, this kind of anagram
in language, I made my figure converse pretty well’’ (3:95). Her description
of what ensues both recalls and seems to challenge Descartes’s point that
an android automaton would not be able to produce language in a convinc-
ingly human manner. She relates: ‘‘At first I was wonderfully pleased with
my contrivance, but there was something so hollow and so ghostly in the
sound that, after a time, I grew perfectly shocked at it, particularly at night;
and having taught it to say ‘O ow I luv u Anna’; it spoke, or I fancied it
spoke, so much in the tone of John Hewit’s voice, who from a natural dia-
lect pronounced with difficulty the aspiration H, that I began to fear it
might introduce a melancholy which would trench upon all those laudable
resolutions I had so properly and so firmly made’’ (3:95–96). ‘‘O ow I luv u
Anna’’ is the one full sentence we know the automaton says; if it has others
in its repertoire, we are not told about them. While Hannah is the source of
the autologon’s movements, speech, and behavior—she is the engineer
behind all of this—her hope is that the autologon’s speech will sound like
her husband’s. Her fantasy, in other words, is that she will encounter the
machine and not apprehend it as a machine but, instead, as a companion.
The result is mixed: the autologon’s voice sounds ghostly and hollow,
and falls somewhere between animate and inanimate, a fantasy brought
partway to life. This situation precisely fulfills two of the conditions Freud
links to the uncanny: first, that ‘‘feelings of the uncanny’’ are often gener-
ated in situations where one is unsure whether an object is animate or inan-
imate, or when the lifeless bears close resemblance to the living; second,
‘‘that an uncanny effect often arises when the boundary between fantasy
and reality is blurred, when we are faced with the reality of something that
we until now considered imaginary, when a symbol takes on the full func-
tion and significance of what it symbolizes.’’30 A further condition of
30. Sigmund Freud, The Uncanny, trans. David McLintock (London: Penguin, 2003), 141,
150.
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the uncanny in Hannah Hewit is an uncertainty as to where a voice is coming
from and whose voice it is. When the autologon begins speaking on its own,
without Hannah’s prompting, it causes Hannah to have a nervous fit, and
she vows never to use it again. The paradoxical effect of Hannah’s project is
that when her model takes on the autonomy she seems to want it to have,
the autonomy she herself lacks, she becomes unable to tolerate it. It
becomes utterly unsettling when it speaks on its own (and it does so only
once), because it mixes the inanimate with the animate too deeply. In con-
temporary robotics, researchers have developed a term to describe this phe-
nomenon. The ‘‘uncanny valley,’’ first described in a 1970 article by Masa-
hiro Mori, designates how human subjects’ responses to humanoid robots,
which are on the whole positive, take a dip with robots that very closely
resemble humans. Karl F. MacDorman, one of Mori’s translators, sum-
marizes the point as follows: ‘‘as robots appear more human, they seem
more familiar until a point is reached at which subtle imperfections create
a sensation of strangeness.’’31 Resemblance that is too close is unheimlich: it
reasserts the difference between the simulated and the real by bringing
them into close proximity.
In view of the formal comparison Dibdin’s novel draws between the
female Robinsonade and the traditional Robinsonade, the android may
not be the only machine in the novel. The plot’s inevitable conclusion in a
reunion between Hannah Hewit and her husband, who is not dead after
all, moves along with predictable regularity. The suggestion, only implicit
here, but drawn out directly in Burney, is that women themselves become
machinelike in their involvement in marriage plot. In tracing how the
automaton explicitly becomes a figure for the female psyche (as it is in Bur-
ney) rather than simply a production of that psyche (as it is in Dibdin), I will
turn to the issues surrounding how the automaton was classified and then
to other popular uses of the term ‘‘automaton’’ as it related to women, parti-
cularly young women. First, however, I want to briefly turn back to speech
and its sources in the Robinsonade.
P A R R O T I N G S P E E C H : R E P E T I T I O N A N D
R E S P O N S I V E N E S S I N A N I M A L S A N D M A C H I N E S
It is hard to ignore the similarity between the scene in which Hannah is
frightened by her automaton and the moment in Robinson Crusoe when Cru-
31. Karl F. MacDorman, ‘‘Androids as an Experimental Apparatus: Why Is There an
Uncanny Valley and Can We Exploit It?’’ (paper published in the proceedings of the CogSci-
2005 Workshop, Toward Social Mechanisms of Android Science, 108–18). An English translation of
Mori’s 1970 article is included as an appendix to MacDorman’s paper. For the original article,
see Masahiro Mori, ‘‘Bukimi no tani,’’ Energy 7 (1970): 33–35.
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soe is awakened by a voice calling his name. In each case, these are the first
voices that the marooned protagonists have heard on their islands other
than their own. Crusoe reports, ‘‘I was wak’d out of my Sleep by a Voice call-
ing me by Name several times, Robin, Robin, Robin Crusoe, poor Robin
Crusoe, where are you Robin Crusoe? Where are you? Where have you
been?’’ He goes on to explain that the voice he hears is Poll’s, his parrot’s:
I was so dead asleep at first . . . that I did not wake thoroughly, but dozing
between sleeping and waking, thought I dream’d that some Body spoke to
me: But as the Voice continu’d to repeat Robin Crusoe, Robin Crusoe, at
last I began to wake more perfectly, and was at first dreadfully frightened,
and started up in the utmost Consternation: But no sooner were my eyes
open, than I saw my Poll sitting on the Top of the Hedge; and immediately
knew that it was he that spoke to me; for just in such bemoaning Language
I had used to talk to him, and teach him; and he learn’d it so perfectly, that
he would sit upon my Finger, and lay his Bill close to my Face, and cry, Poor
Robin Crusoe, Where are you? Where have you been? How come you here? (121)
These plaintive questions place Crusoe’s self-address in the mouth of a
speaking parrot. Crusoe recognizes that he is the source of the phrases Poll
utters, and that Poll has learned to speak by repeating the words and
phrases it has heard Crusoe use. Unlike Hannah’s automaton, which can
only speak when set in motion (except at the end, right before Hannah
turns it off), Poll can speak without Crusoe’s direct assistance and can con-
tinue to learn. As a result, the status of Poll’s speech is distinct from that of
the automaton’s: however mechanical it may seem, it is more voluntary.
This shifts the parallels that are running between the texts. Whereas the
automaton is initially presented as a mechanical Friday, the scene in which
it speaks compares it instead to Poll. As the machine-human comparison
gets refigured as a machine-animal comparison, the automaton persists in
being less convincing than the living beings to which it is compared. The
parrot proves a more spontaneous speaker than the automaton, even
though it can only repeat the words it has heard Crusoe say, whereas the
automaton has been built to replicate someone else’s speech and does not
repeat what Hannah says.
The speaking figure Hannah builds, and its comparison to Friday and
Poll, unsettles the taxonomy that divides the human from the nonhuman
based on speech and reorients the distinction by suggesting that responsive-
ness, which divides the animate from the inanimate, is in fact a far more sig-
nificant quality. In the scenes that follow Hannah’s decision to put her
automaton away, she returns to the society of animals on her island, and
Leo, her treasured lion, saves her from a baboon that tries to embrace her.
When doing this, Leo has ‘‘tenderness . . . manifest in his eyes’’ and is ‘‘like a
gallant Englishman’’; his display of emotion, even though it is not articu-
lated in speech, makes him more like a human than the android automa-
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ton. Hannah Hewit’s encounters with autologon and lion display the arc of
public opinion about the possibility of a reasoning machine over the course
of roughly two decades. In 1770, when Darwin and Kempelen begin to
build their speaking machines, ‘‘inanimate reason,’’ as one treatise on intel-
ligent automata had it, was thought to be a genuine possibility, even though
it was not yet realized.32 But by the 1790s, two of the most famous examples
of intelligent automata, Kempelen’s chess player and the speaking infant,
had been exposed as fakes that relied on hidden humans. This, in conjunc-
tion with the fact that the genuine speaking machines that had been dis-
played had extremely limited capacities and could only respond with set
phrases, tempered the optimistic belief in the development of reasoning
machines. Either a human supplied the machine’s apparent rationality, or
the machine seemed like a frightening and uneven replica of a living being.
If Hannah Hewit’s response is any indication, a living animal is a better
companion than a clockwork autologon because it can respond to a chang-
ing environment. By the time Dibdin was writing, then, the animal was no
longer the main example of the nonrational being, as it was for Descartes;
animals proved more alive and more responsive—more alive because more
responsive—and better companions than machines.
T H E D I F F I C U L T Y O F L E A R N I N G N O T T O B E A N
A U T O M A T O N : A U T O M A T A A N D F E M A L E
E D U C A T I O N
Despite the automaton’s android appearance, it challenges the anthropo-
centrism of discussions of life and intelligence by demonstrating that the
distinction between animate and inanimate is stronger than that between
human and animal. In this regard, the dividing line is constituted not by
language but rather by educability. Eighteenth-century automata, unlike
humans and animals, cannot learn: they have no capacity for improvement
or development. So even if automata can mimic physiological processes,
they are fundamentally limited by their lack of sensory apparatus. This is
what Rousseau suggests in Emile when he notes that if a man were born as
an adult, that is, born full grown, he would be ‘‘a perfect ideot, an automa-
ton’’ and would ‘‘see nothing, know nothing, understand nothing.’’33 In
Emile, the automaton is the figure of the perpetual child who never learns
how to process the information it receives from its senses. In fact, real
automata were frequently built in the form of children, and Kempelen
32. Carl Gottlieb von Windisch, Inanimate Reason, or A Circumstantial Account of M. de Kempe-
len’s Chess Player (London: Printed for S. Bladon, 1784).
33. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile, or On Education, trans. and ed. Allan Bloom and Christo-
pher Kelly (Lebanon, NH: Dartmouth College Press, 2010), 8.
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intended to house his speaking machine in the form of a child about six
years of age, which he thought would be appropriate to the machine’s tone
and pronunciation.34 But automata, unlike living children, do not grow or
learn; they just repeat the same set of actions over and over again, drawing
silhouettes of the king and queen, or playing a melody on the flute. Even
though La Mettrie expresses the belief in L’homme machine that both ani-
mals and machines might speak, by the end of the century only the former
option was held open in any seriousness. Mechanical mimesis reaches a
limit when it comes to replicating responsiveness, demonstrating that the
materialist principle of machinelike thought and feeling does not therefore
mean that machines can think or feel. Even if there are certain aspects of
human physiology that might function mechanically and might be repli-
cated by machines, automata show that the notion of physiological mecha-
nism does not therefore entail that of machine life.
In the Robinsonade, the automaton represents first the possibility and
then the failure of machine intelligence. Hannah Hewit introduces and
then dismisses the automaton as a potential companion, and her return to
the society of animals highlights the genre’s emphasis on responsiveness
and sensitivity as the criteria for companionship and interaction. Animals
prove less radically other than machines because their behavior can change
and develop over time. This upends Descartes’s assertion that animals can-
not be behavioristically distinguished from machines and in fact helps to
shift the epithet nonrational from animal to machine. The taxonomic work
accomplished by Hannah Hewit is twofold: first, it clarifies that artificial intel-
ligence, however persuasive it might be conceptually, is not equipped to
overcome its artificiality, and that the differences between an inanimate
android and a living human are far greater than those between humans and
other animal species. Second, in directing attention to the issue of respon-
siveness, it highlights development and specifically education as important
features of living beings. This lays the groundwork for the subsequent
appearance of automata in Burney’s Camilla, where they are part and parcel
of the perilous project of female education, and they illuminate mindless-
ness and mechanism in different locales.
In 1796, the year Camilla was published, an educational treatise ad-
dressed to young girls uses the term ‘‘automaton’’ to describe women
behaving badly, that is mechanically, without thinking. The automaton
serves as a negative example of female conduct, and the young narrator,
who acts as the exemplar, describes how she wishes to distinguish herself
from these machinelike women: ‘‘The two ladies smiled, and told me, a
woman was amiable, when she had wit and understanding; that they called
34. See Thomas L. Hankins and Robert J. Silverman, Instruments and the Imagination (Prince-
ton University Press, 1995), 196.
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fools, statues or automatons, because an automaton was a machine that
walked, played on the flute, and did many other things, though it was noth-
ing but a statue made of a piece of wood; and that fools spoke, walked, and
did every thing without thinking, like an automaton.—Ah, ladies, said I to
them, teach me what I must do to learn to think; for I should be very sorry
to be an automaton.’’35 The idea that a young woman must learn not to be
an automaton can be tied to a wider-ranging female educational project, as
well as to how Burney’s fictions in particular depict such a project. The use
of the term ‘‘automaton’’ to describe a mindless human character, specifi-
cally a mindless woman, retains the connotation of nonrationality we saw
develop in response to the failure of machines to approximate intelligence.
It presents mindlessness as the result of a certain form of femininity that
does not prioritize reason and, in the most extreme cases, evacuates the
body of it. This unfolds in complicated and contradictory ways in Camilla,
but what is clear at the outset is that as the term ‘‘automaton’’ shifts into the
register of metaphor, it is still primarily a designation of nonrationality. So
the automaton, as it moves from a deserted island into the lives of young
women navigating fashionable society, becomes much more explicitly a fig-
ure for the perils of being too beautiful or too ugly, too intelligent or too
unintelligent. In the broadest sense, the automaton is mobilized as an
object (i.e., something one might encounter) in Hannah Hewit and as a sub-
ject (i.e., something one might become) in Camilla. But the latter use of the
term, as something one might become, designates a deeply impoverished
state of mind. Whereas Hannah Hewit represents the attempt to make a
machine like a human, Camilla describes humans—or rather, women—
who have become machines. As the directionality of the project switches, it
is no longer about the elevation, or even evolution, of machines, but about
the devolution or impairment of women.
While the society depicted by the Robinsonade, comprising the Crusoe
figure along with his or her animal and human companions, is in the
broadest sense a political arrangement, it is also in some sense deeply soli-
tary. This political fiction can include female protagonists but it is funda-
mentally nonreproductive: it reconstructs the fiction of the state of nature,
then the natural emergence of the state, with a single human at its center.
Dibdin’s female Robinsonade uses marriage rather than the social contract
as its organizing principle, but it remains committed to both the solitariness
and the nonreproductive aspects of the traditional Robinsonade. The soci-
ety that concerns Burney, in contrast, is full of other people making
demands and judgments: it is rarely solitary and it is fundamentally repro-
35. Tea-Table Dialogues between a Governess and Mary Sensible, Eliza Thoughtful, Jane Bloom, Ann
Hopeful, Dinah Sterling, Lucy Lively, and Emma Tempest (London: Printed and sold by Darton and
Harvey, 1796), 8.
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ductive, not only in the sense that it is concerned with social reproduction
but also in the sense that it is concerned with marriage’s importance to the
fate of families. Camilla follows the romantic lives of the Tyrold sisters, and
their cousin, Indiana Lynmere, in the process presenting what might be
called the female mind/body problem. The female mind/body problem is
a specifically female version of the typical dualist question of how we under-
stand the relation between, and comparative importance of, mind and
body: its opposed terms are beauty and intellect, and it asks how a woman’s
appearance and her personality affect the way she fares within the marriage
market. Burney makes a point of separating mind from body and body
from mind to expose, by way of extremes, how the automaton—the beauti-
ful, mindless female—represents the desired ideal as well as the prospect of
being cast out of one’s own mind. The women who get described as autom-
ata in Camilla have become machines—they look like humans, but they fail
to reason and respond like humans.
Early in the novel, Sir Hugh, the Tyrold girls’ wealthy uncle, lays bare the
evaluative structure that governs much of the rest of the novel: ‘‘[He] was
much struck with the beauty of his three nieces, particularly with that of
Camilla. . . . ‘Yet she is not,’ he cried, ‘so pretty as her little sister Eugenia,
nor much better than t’other sister Lavinia; and not one of the three is half
so great a beauty as my little Indiana.’’36 Much of the novel’s exploration of
the female mind/body problem follows from the respective fate of these
two beauties, Eugenia and Indiana. Whereas Indiana retains her beauty,
Eugenia promptly loses hers. Under Sir Hugh’s care, which proves deeply
neglectful, the uninoculated Eugenia is exposed to smallpox and dropped
from Sir Hugh’s arms on a see-saw in the course of a single outing. Euge-
nia’s fall leaves her with a permanent limp and her smallpox scars her face
profoundly; when Sir Hugh visits her for the first time after these accidents,
he sees ‘‘not a trace of her beauty left, no resemblance by which he could
have known her’’ (29). He attaches female identity as well as female value to
outward appearance, with the result that he thinks Eugenia has effectively
become someone else and has lost her worth. Weeping, he exclaims that he
will offer her ‘‘a guinea for every pit in that poor face’’: his desire to compen-
sate her for the loss of her face’s value equates beauty with earning power
(30). The reparative fantasy of filling in Eugenia’s pockmarks with coins
imagines that Eugenia can only be restored to herself if her looks are
restored, which is impossible; Sir Hugh expresses his dismay at how thor-
oughly the change in appearance has changed her by saying, ‘‘She’s not like
the same thing! . . . I can’t so much as believe her to be the same, though I
am sure of its being true’’ (33).
36. Frances Burney, Camilla, or A Picture of Youth, ed. Edward A. Bloom and Lillian D. Bloom
(Oxford University Press, 1983), 11, hereafter cited parenthetically in the text.
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As Eugenia turns to education, to develop her ‘‘moral beauty’’ by train-
ing her mind, her cultivated intellect and deformed appearance unfolds
alongside its converse, Indiana’s vacant mind and perfect exterior (51).
Indiana is described as a ‘‘beautiful automaton,’’ and later a ‘‘beautiful
doll,’’ void of understanding as well as sympathy (191, 221). Eugenia, in
contrast, has more understanding and sympathy, but proportionately more
trouble in her romantic affairs, not only because she is prey to fortune hun-
ters once she has been made Sir Hugh’s heiress, but also because she has
been raised without mirrors and without an awareness of how serious her
deformity is. All of this changes when a boy shouts at her, ‘‘What were you
put up there for, miss? To frighten the crows?’’ (286). This prompts Euge-
nia to go into seclusion, and when Camilla goes to comfort her, Eugenia is
so upset that her speech comes in short bursts: ‘‘But yet—at the age of fif-
teen—at the instant of entering into the world—at the approach of form-
ing a connection which—O Camilla! What a time, what a period, to dis-
cover—to know—that I cannot even be seen without being derided and
offended’’ (295). Eugenia then wraps herself in the curtains in a gesture of
self-abnegation, hiding the body that has marked her.
Once Eugenia knows how she looks, another automaton figure enters
the mix, but this beautiful, mindless woman moves quickly from the realm
of the apparently ideal (which Indiana occupies) to the frightening. I sug-
gested earlier that the automaton is both a desideratum and a threat; Indi-
ana-as-automaton is the former, whereas this subsequent automaton figure,
female, beautiful, and unnamed, is the latter. In this episode, Mr. Tyrold
takes Camilla and Eugenia to see a stunning young woman, whom they first
glimpse through a window and then see in her yard. It gradually becomes
clear that this woman is an ‘‘idiot,’’ as she laughs shrilly, turns round ‘‘with a
velocity that no machine could have exceeded,’’ and repeats short phrases,
like ‘‘Good day!’’ (309). As they continue to watch her, she drools and tears
off her handkerchief, stretches it tight across her face, and proceeds to
strike herself on the head with her hands (309). When the woman repeats
set phrases and motions over and over again, she resembles an automaton
far more closely than Indiana does. This scene presents a grotesque version
of mindless beauty, and, like the footrace between old women in Evelina, it
devolves human characters into object lessons that elicit both sympathy and
schadenfreude. It is harnessed to the lesson that being mechanical—being
like an automaton—is a far worse fate than being ugly. But the novel
expresses ambivalence on this topic, and when Eugenia responds by saying,
‘‘Will any egotism ever again make me believe no lot so hapless as my
own! . . . I will call to my mind this spectacle of human degradation—and
submit, at least with calmness, to my lighter evils and milder fate,’’ her self-
chastisement does not stop to register that she is no more responsible for
her appearance than this young girl is for her disability (311). Mr. Tyrold’s
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pat reinforcement, ‘‘You have seen, here, the value of intellects in viewing
the horror of their loss; and you have witnessed, that beauty, without mind,
is more dreadful than any deformity’’ seems to suggest that intellection is a
balm for deformity, but rings false (311).
The automaton is a figure for the lack of female autonomy (the horror
of the loss of intellect is also the horror of the loss of controlled response),
but states of reduced autonomy are not limited to the automaton. In fact,
they attach to almost every female character in the novel. If this episode is
designed to place Eugenia in front of this living automaton (who is an
automaton in part because she cannot learn) to demonstrate just how dif-
ferent they are, it does not wholly succeed in any straightforward way. Even
though Eugenia recognizes her difference from the beautiful but senseless
creature, this difference does not precisely entail autonomy but instead
‘‘shame’’ and self-regulation. The encounter between mindless beauty and
physically deformed mind, in other words, does not triumphantly cast off
standards of appearance to embrace self-determination but, instead, illumi-
nates a complicated calculus of self-consolation and ‘‘reproof’’ (311).
This calculus and its limits cause another variety of machinelike behavior
in Camilla. Whereas Indiana and the beautiful idiot are permanently autom-
ata, other female characters enter such states temporarily, often because of
distraction. In the presence of Edgar, for example, Camilla does not know
what book she has in her hand, because ‘‘she had held the book mechani-
cally, and knew not what it was,’’ and later, in a similar state, discussing her
sister’s naı¨vete´ about suitors, she is ‘‘irresistibly seized by a new train of
ideas . . . she mechanically repeated his last word ‘opinion?’’’ (195, 342).37
This mechanical behavior indexes distress and temporary mindlessness as
well as the social constraints governing polite behavior, and it is motivated
by a surplus of feeling even though it displays none. When Camilla dances
with Lord Pervil, ‘‘instead of finding the animated beauty . . . he seemed
coupled with a fair lifeless machine, whom the music, perforce, put in
motion’’ (714). Here, becoming a machine is a coping strategy, and Camil-
la’s reduced autonomy does not simply follow from but, instead, causes her
temporary lifelessness. This is not to say that Camilla chooses to become life-
less, but that these sequences of machinelike or mechanical behavior high-
light the pervasiveness of obstacles to female self-determination. Ultimately,
the implication is that any woman might become an automaton; the fig-
ure’s reach expands beyond the mindless beauty to include other types of
37. Burney also describes minor characters obsessed with the vagaries of fashion as mechan-
ical. Miss Dennel, for example, when she visits the Pantiles, ‘‘kept her mouth open, and her
head jerking from object to object, so incessantly, that she saw nothing distinctly, from the
eagerness of her fear lest anything should escape her.’’ See Camilla, 394. On this topic, see also
Lynch, The Economy of Character ; and Park, The Self and It.
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women, at least temporarily. This means that the automaton shifts from
being an example of negative femininity to being an example of femininity
as such. Though of course autonomy is only realized fully as a fantasy, and
though a range of factors determine the possible actions of men and
women in Burney’s novel, the point remains that only women are described
as machines. Their machinelike quality denotes a lack of intention and
choice, and in view of this, the novel’s interest in accidents and misunder-
standings, events for which responsibility and blame is difficult at best,
seems formally appropriate because it substitutes the language of chance or
necessity for that of individual action and responsibility.
F I C T I O N A N D T H E M A C H I N E : C L A S S I F I C A T I O N
A N D T H E V I T A L P R I N C I P L E O F C H A N G E
Both Hannah Hewit and Camilla address a problem that has preoccupied
the discourse of the machine body since Descartes—the comparative im-
portance of bodily appearance and function, on the one hand, and mind-
edness, on the other. They do so not to weigh the comparative merits of
dualism and materialism but, instead, to think through the forms and
boundaries of life as they relate not only to men but also to women. Dibdin’s
novel demonstrates, by way of its failed autologon, that the appearance of
human form does not guarantee an intelligent being, and its evaluation of
the sensitivity and responsiveness of animals and machines, respectively,
occurs in the context of its revision of the Robinsonade to include a female
protagonist. The entanglement between the female Crusoe and her animal
and machine companions follows from a specifically female sociability. Dib-
din rewrites the Robinsonade as an adventure that confirms the gravita-
tional pull of the marriage plot. This in turn overlays the woman-animal-
machine schema onto the man-animal taxonomy of Defoe’s original, with
the result that Hannah Hewit introduces an automaton into its state of
nature to naturalize the female need for matrimony, much as Robinson Cru-
soe naturalizes Friday’s servitude. On the most basic level, the Robinsonade
uses divisions between kinds (man and animal, or woman and machine) to
describe how particular political and social formations emerge. It is well
established that the question of how man relates to animal provides the
grounds for Robinson Crusoe’s discussion of sovereignty, but what is perhaps
less obvious, in part because Dibdin’s novel shifts from the serious to the
satirical and back again, is that it too is telling a tale about the origins of par-
ticular social forms by presenting the boundary between the human and
the android as specifically female. The female Crusoe’s choice to use her
inventive powers to recreate her husband offers the message that matri-
mony is an essential part of the female condition. It is here that the connec-
tion between Dibdin’s and Burney’s novels is clearest: both use the automa-
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ton to indicate the importance of the conjugal imperative to the female
imagination.
Whereas for Dibdin the automaton is expressive of what he considers a
natural desire, for Burney it is indicative of how ideology shapes what it is
possible to desire, say, or do. For each, the automaton represents some-
thing specific to femininity, either as it is imagined in its natural state or as
it is experienced in a social setting. Crucially, however, in Hannah Hewit the
automaton remains external to human life, whereas in Camilla it does not.
So while in Dibdin’s novel women are brought into contact with machines,
in Burney’s, they become them. Though Dibdin maintains a clear separa-
tion between kinds, Burney does not. Hannah Hewit is interested in repre-
senting the distinctions between women, animals, and machines to shore
up the foundational role of marriage, and it never seriously considers the
possibility of a genuinely hybrid form between woman and machine. Its tax-
onomy is focused on comparing the differences between broad categories
without ever seriously transgressing the separation between them. Burney,
in contrast, imports the machine into the lives and minds of her female
characters and uses the figure of the automaton to represent a hybrid form.
Camilla moves the work of taxonomy from an interspecies, inter-kind prac-
tice to an intraspecies, intra-kind practice.
While in Hannah Hewit the autologon can be put away once it has failed
to fulfill its promise of inanimate reason, the automaton cannot be so easily
partitioned from either organic or human life in Camilla. This is because
the automaton is human, as we have seen, but not fully; it is an impaired
being. Whereas Hannah Hewit excludes the machine from its social world,
focusing instead on the shared community of humans and other animals,
Camilla positions the machine as central to its social world. Here, the repre-
sentation of the machine echoes later Romantic criticisms of the mechani-
cal as something that has form imposed from without rather than develop-
ing from within, as Coleridge will later put it.38 But crucially the machine,
though inimical to life, is positioned in the middle of human life: in all cases
but one, the women who display machinelike behavior do so as a result of,
even a response to, others’ evaluations of them. In other words, the female
automaton is initially sensate but becomes insensate, and though it may be
a stretch to say that it is educated into insensibility, for Burney the female
automaton is the perverse result of a bad education that does not aim to
develop its subjects into independent beings.
Despite the stark differences between Dibdin’s and Burney’s novels,
together they demonstrate why the rise and fall of the eighteenth-century
38. ‘‘The form is mechanic, when on any given material we impress a pre-determined form,
not necessarily arising out of the properties of the material’’ (S. T. Coleridge, quoted in Denise
Gigante, Life: Organic Form and Romanticism [New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009], 4–5).
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autologon is significant not simply to the history of automata but also to the
history of the human-animal debate and to the history of fiction more gen-
erally. I have suggested that fiction highlights the significance of automata
by situating them in larger taxonomic projects. But it is also the case
that automata highlight the significance of fiction or, rather, that they
make a major feature of it visible: its interest in the contingency and the
mutability of distinctions between different forms of life. It is not simply the
presence of android automata but the failure of machines to seem like liv-
ing creatures that defines the taxonomic aspect of these novels. Taxonomy,
of course, entails inclusion as well as exclusion: the exclusion of android
machines from reason and responsiveness helps to distinguish between the
animate and the animated, while the presentation of women as machines
demonstrates that these classifications of animate and animated can over-
lap. As Dibdin’s and Burney’s novels work to sort automata from lions, or
fashionable from impaired women, they continue to refine constitutive
divisions of life.
Both Dibdin and Burney use human or humanoid machines to trouble
the apparently solid link between human form and intelligence. In each
novel, the nonrational encroaches on the rational, and though this is moti-
vated by different agendas in each text, in both cases it demonstrates that
supposedly fixed categories such as the human and the machine can shift.
This matters because it represents taxonomy as a continuing rather than an
absolute process and as a central feature of fiction. It suggests, in other
words, that taxonomy is not simply a concern of particular genres, like the
Robinsonade, but a broader issue for late eighteenth-century fiction in gen-
eral. The automaton places particular emphasis on the place of the machine
in the concept of life, but it is by no means the only kind of fictional being
that exists at or beyond the boundaries of the human during this period—
others include speaking animals and objects, and disfigured or impaired
humans. These characters often appear as tools of satire and sentiment, and
they participate in what I have described as fiction’s specific form of taxon-
omy, which is to say a demonstration of how category distinctions are hardly
absolute. Automata, like these other borderline cases, allow fiction to exper-
iment with different permutations of speech, appearance, and mindedness,
and to elevate animals or devolve human characters. These moments pre-
cipitate localized shifts in the boundaries of categories of being while also
revealing the intellectual infrastructure behind such shifts. Fiction’s invest-
ment in the categories and forms of life does not ossify them but sets them
in motion. This produces a variety of configurations which demonstrate that
the crucial difference between animate creatures and animated machines is
the former’s ability to develop and change over time. The female’s encoun-
ter with the automaton as a material object and as a state of mind underlines
the importance of educability to human life. If the Romantic idea of life
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arises in part because of the machine’s radical otherness and lack of respon-
siveness—if life becomes associated with change and adaptation in part
because the machine cannot change or adapt—what the automaton
demonstrates is that the boundaries of life are not thinkable without the
machine.
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